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This paper presents the results of an experiment on mutual versus common knowl-
edge of advice in a two-player weak-link game with random matching. Our experimen-
tal subjects play in pairs for thirteen rounds. After a brief learning phase common to
all treatments, we vary the knowledge levels associated with external advice given in
the form of a suggestion to pick the strategy supporting the payo-dominant equilib-
rium. In the mutual knowledge of level 1 treatment, the suggestion appears on every
subject's monitor at the beginning of every round, with no common knowledge that
everybody sees the same suggestion. In the mutual knowledge of level 2 treatment,
the same suggestion appears on each subject's monitor, accompanied by the request to
\send" the suggestion to the partner in the round, followed by a notication that the
message has been read. Finally, in the common knowledge treatment, the suggestion
is read aloud by the experimenter at the end of the learning phase. Our results are
somewhat surprising and can be summarized as follows: in all our treatments both the
choice of the eciency-inducing action and the percentage of ecient equilibrium play
are higher with respect to the control treatment, revealing that even a condition as
weak as mutual knowledge of level 1 is sucient to signicantly increase the salience
of the ecient equilibrium with respect to the absence of advice. Furthermore, and
contrary to our hypothesis, mutual knowledge of level 2 (as the one occurring in our
\message" treatment) induces successful coordination more frequently than common
knowledge.
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11 Epistemic attitudes: The formal and the experimen-
tal
The purpose of this paper is to discuss some experimental results on the role of common
knowledge as a coordination device in a weak-link coordination game from the point of view
of formal epistemology.
Common knowledge has long been regarded as a fundamental component in the modeling
of rational interaction. As such, it features prominently, though informally, in Nash's char-
acterization of equilibrium. As game theory evolved towards capturing increasingly more
rened solution concepts, common knowledge was there to stay as a fundamental modeling
assumption. Harsanyi and Selten, to mention a particularly relevant example from the point
of view of the present paper, put forward a view according to which the assumption of com-
mon knowledge of the players' rationality is sucient to ensure the joint selection of ecient
equilibria in (non-pure) coordination games.
In a line of research which for a long time has been developed almost independently
of the game-theoretic one, epistemic logicians have advanced, over the past two decades,
rigorous characterizations of the epistemic attitudes of both individual and group knowledge
and belief. The emergence of multi-agent epistemic logic thus enabled, around mid 1990s,
the development of rigorous analyses of the epistemic conditions underlying game theoretic
solution concepts.
The ensuing investigations on the connection between rational agents' epistemic atti-
tudes and their strategic behavior tended to fall into two seldom communicating categories,
the formal and the experimental. This paper constitutes an attempt at fostering the cross-
fertilization between those lines of research. It aims at so doing by taking full advantage of
the mutual feedback that experimental economics and formal epistemology can give one an-
other. Formal epistemology lends methodological clarity to experimental analysis, especially
concerning modeling assumptions. In turn, experimental analysis gives empirical substance
to the formal analysis of epistemic attitudes of group knowledge. This results in a virtuous
circle, which we expect to be a key feature of the emerging eld of experimental formal
epistemology. From this vantage point, our contribution speaks to the community of experi-
mental economists, to game theorists interested in the renement of epistemic conditions for
solution concepts, and to the relatively younger community of logicians and philosophers of
logic interested in empirical evidence on modes of reasoning1)
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the weak-link coordination game
used in our experiment and Section 2.1 discusses the relevant related literature. The ex-
perimental design is then illustrated in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of
the experimental results regarding choice behavior (Section 4.2) and the subjects' beliefs
(Section 4.1). Section 5 draws some general conclusions about our rather surprising ndings
and delineates what we envisage to be promising future lines of development of the research
reported in this paper. The remainder of this Section aims at illustrating the motivation
1See van Benthem (2008) and Verbrugge (2009) for two inuential position papers, and D'Agostino (2010)
for an example of a logic for realistic agents.
2of this work by presenting an outline of how the recent research on epistemic attitudes has
tended to fall under the \formal" and the \experimental" headings, with very little overlap.
1.1 The formal
Robert Aumann opens his classic paper on correlated equilibrium by reviewing the concept
of Nash Equilibrium and asks
why should any player assume that the other players will play their components
[of a Nash Equilibrium] and indeed why should they? [:::] In a two-person game,
for example, Player 1 would play his component only if he believes that Player
2 will play his; this in turn would be justied only by 2's belief that 1 will play
his component; and so on. (Aumann, 1987)
The von Neumann-Nash analysis of game-theoretic equilibrium relies essentially on the
concept of best-response which is normatively prescribed to a rational player only under the
assumption of the players' common knowledge of each others' rationality (and, clearly, of
the game). It is certainly beyond the scope of the present paper to discuss which solution
concept is appropriate for a justied formal characterisation of rational interaction. Yet
what Aumann's remark clearly illustrates is the centrality of epistemic attitudes in the game-
theoretic analysis of rational interaction.
In hindsight two things appear to be rather surprising. The rst, is that game theorists,
and economists in general, have been rather happy with an intuitive (as opposed to math-
ematically rigorous) notion of \knowledge" for their modeling until (Aumann, 1976) put
forward what have become known as Aumann structures. In an nutshell, the construction of
the Aumann structure begins, in continuity with the (single-agent) decision theoretic tradi-
tion, by postulating the existence of a state space, which is assumed to provide a complete
description of the \world". To each individual agent (in a nite set, interpreted as \player")
is associated a specic partition of the state space. As in Savage's model, events { the object
of the agents' knowledge{ are subsets of the set of states. The operations of individual,
mutual and common knowledge are dened by suitably constrained operators on the algebra
generated by the partitions of the state space. Aumann's formalization of players' epistemic
attitudes has eectively given rise to what is now referred to the actively researched area of
epistemic game theory2.
This leads us to the second surprising fact (in hindsight), namely that it took a relatively
long time for game theorists and formal epistemologists to realize that they were working
on essentially similar problems. Indeed, philosophers have long been interested in epistemic
attitudes as specic instances of the wider class of intentional attitudes. Put very crudely,
epistemic attitudes capture the relation between an agent's reasoning (and disposition to
act) and the information they possess. The rst systematic attempt at giving this relation
a rigorous logical formalization appeared in (Hintikka, 1962). This work paved the way for
the syntactic development of epistemic logic which was soon to be complemented by the
2See Brandenburger (2008) for a terse overview of the eld.
3introduction of relational semantics (or Kripke frames)3. By the mid-1990s epistemic logic
was a standard analytical tool in articial intelligence (Meyer and van der Hoek, 1995)
Since Hintikka's pioneering work, epistemic logicians have tended to focus on normative
models of individual knowing and believing4 These notions were extended to their multi-
agent counterpart in the context of articial intelligence5. In an attempt to make this paper
as self-contained as possible, we now briey recall the central epistemic attitudes captured
in multi-agent epistemic logic, namely individual, mutual and common knowledge6
Let N be a set of agents, S be a set of states (or \possible worlds") and ; etc. be
sentences of some propositional (modal) logic. The key intuition captured by epistemic logics
is that when being in epistemic state, say, s, agent i may access other epistemic states, say
t. This motivates the introduction of an accessibility relation Ri  S2 (one for each agent
i 2 N). We say that an agent i 2 N in epistemic state s 2 S knows  just if  is true (in
the classical logic sense) in all epistemic states which are accessible to i from s. Distinct
formalizations of \knowledge" (and \belief") emerge as a consequence of the constraints
that we are justied to impose on the relation R. In the most widely studied (multi-agent)
epistemic logic, known as S5, R is an equivalence relation, thus making the resulting logical
characterization of knowledge eectively equivalent to that provided by Aumann's structures.
This individual knowledge operator naturally extends to groups of agents as follows7.
Suppose, for denitiveness, that i and j are the only members of group G  N. If both i
and j know , we say that \ is mutual knowledge among group G". Since this latter can be
expressed as a well-formed formula of epistemic logic, the construction can be iterated, so
we can have that \i and j know that  is mutual knowledge among group G". This sentence
thus expresses second-level mutual knowledge, because i knows that j knows that they both
know , and so on. When the mutual knowledge operator is iterated innitely many times,
we say that  is common knowledge between i and j, a concept introduced 8 by Lewis (1969).
Over the past two decades or so, the formal analysis of (group) epistemic attitudes has
led the momentous development of both formal epistemology (see, e.g. Hendricks, 2005)
and epistemic game theory9. As to this latter, it is well worth recalling how the rigorous
characterization of epistemic attitudes has resulted in a much sharper analysis of the \epis-
temic conditions" yielding various kinds of solution concepts. A particularly interesting case
in point, from the point of view of this paper, is the demotion of the common-knowledge
condition for Nash equilibrium put forward by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), where
3See e.g. Blackburn et al. (2001) for a state-of-the-art introduction to Modal logic and Blackburn et al.
(2007) for a comprehensive account of its development.
4Recent attention has been devoted to the logic of \being informed " and that of \being aware". See
Allo (2011) and Halpern and Pucella (2007), Halpern and R^ ego (2008) for recent overviews, respectively. On
awareness, the interested reader can consult Burkhard Schipper's bibliography Schipper (2012).
5Fagin et al. (1996) collects various works providing the rst systematic formalization of the epistemic
interaction of logical agents.
6Self-contained formal presentations can be found in Fagin et al. (1996) and van Ditmarsch et al. (2007).
7Cf. what Aumann dubs \syntactical structures" in Aumann (1999)
8For an overview on the notion of common knolwedge, see Vanderschraaf and Sillari (2007).
9In turn, both areas contributed essentially to the development of the social software research programme
(see, e.g. Parikh, 2002)
4it is shown that decidedly weaker conditions (some involving mutual knowledge) suce for
the justication of the classical solution concept. The main result reported in this paper,
namely that in the weak-link game of our experimental setting mutual knowledge leads to
the selection of ecient equilibria more frequently than common knowledge, certainly adds
experimental support to such a demotion of common knowledge in rational interaction.
In addition to making rigorous the otherwise rather subtle distinction between mutual
and common knowledge, the general framework of formal epistemology caters for another
conceptual distinction playing a fundamental role in the present investigation, namely the
distinction between normative and descriptive accounts of epistemic attitudes. Whilst the
former prescribe how extremely idealized agents should behave in order to qualify as ra-
tional, the latter aims at describing the behavior of actual agents (e.g. our experimental
subjects) facing choice problems which involve reasoning about other agents' epistemic at-
titudes. Building on this distinction, the experimental results discussed in this paper oer
rather unexpected insights about the epistemic reasoning of real agents, which nonetheless
might prove useful, as we shall insist in the concluding section of this paper to both designing
types of non-idealized epistemic agents and to specifying their (strategic) interaction.
1.2 The experimental
With the present contribution we relate to two connected strands of experimental and be-
havioral literature 10, namely the extensive experimental literature on coordination games
and the philosophical and experimental literature on social conventions and social norms.
Among the early advocates of the empirical investigation of coordination games is Thomas
Schelling, who, at the beginning of the 1960s pointed out how
One cannot, without empirical evidence, deduce what understandings can be
perceived in a non-zero sum game of maneuver any more than one can prove, by
purely formal deduction, that a particular joke is bound to be funny (Schelling,
1980, p.164)
The power of \focal points" to facilitate coordination, which Schelling himself tested in
a series of informal experiments with his students, was rst identied empirically by Mehta
et al. (1994), who introduced the notion of \Schelling salience" to refer to features - such
as action labels or others (see, e.g. Bacharach and Bernasconi , 1997; Cubitt and Sudgen,
2003) - able to confer unambiguous distinctiveness to one specic equilibrium. The power
of \Schelling salience" to focus players' expectations on some unique outcome and hence to
solve coordination problems is most evident in so-called games of pure coordination, i.e.,
games in which all equilibria are payo-equivalent. As a result, the essence of this kind of
coordination problems consists only in avoiding a disequilibrium outcome. A dierent, but
closely related class of coordination games contains games with multiple equilibria, some
of which are more rewarding than others for all players. Typically, these games embody a
10For a primer on the use of the experimental method in economics, see (Friedman et. al, 1994) for a
critical survey of experiments in game theory see (Camerer, 2003).
5tension between eciency and security (or risk-dominance), as players choosing strategies
that support payo-superior equilibria incur in greater losses if their choice is not matched
by all other players. As a consequence, two types of coordination failure may occur: a
disequilibrium outcome and coordination on a suboptimal equilibrium.
Harsanyi and Selten (1988) formalized the tradeo implicit in these games and stated
that rational players, in the presence of common knowledge of rationality, should select the
ecient (i.e., payo-dominant) equilibrium. However, a plethora of experimental studies
on the stag hunt and weak-link games (see, e.g. Cooper et. al, 1990, 1992; Van Huyck
et al., 1990) has convincingly demonstrated that Harsanyi and Selten's prediction holds
true only under very special conditions, while in all remaining cases coordination failure
occurs almost invariably. Starting from these results, most of the subsequent experimental
studies on coordination have been aimed at identifying the eciency-enhancing properties
of several features of the strategic interaction at hand. Our study contributes to this strand
of literature by identifying the epistemic conditions that, in a specic experimental setup
highly conducive to coordination failure, render external interventions in the form of third
party announcements eective in directing the players' choices towards superior and more
risky equilibria.
The second strand of research to which our investigation is related includes the philo-
sophical and experimental literature on social conventions and social norms pioneered by
the game theoretically informed work of Lewis (1969) on conventions. David Lewis' account
of social convention is based on coordination games. When players' interests are aligned
(as in pure coordination games) and interactions are recurrent, players may succeed in co-
ordinating their behavior by selecting a salient equilibrium. If they recurrently succeed in
coordinating, the regular solution becomes salient by virtue of precedent, and, according to
Lewis's denition, is a social convention. When there is a trade-o between security and
eciency (as in the kind of coordination game our experimental work focuses on), payo
considerations make the choice of salient equilibrium particularly relevant. Lewis's account
requires that conventions be common knowledge and the importance of such an epistemic
requirement, especially with reference to salience, has been a debated issue in the literature
(see Section 2.1 below). The present contribution investigates the eectiveness of various
levels of epistemic access to the salience-inducing coordination device (i.e. a suggestion to
play the strategy supporting the ecient equilibrium), thus contributing to the discussion
on the role of common knowledge in coordination and convention.
Lewis's work on social conventions has spun a vast literature in philosophy of social
sciences. Particularly relevant are accounts of social norms based, to varying degrees, on
Lewis's idea of convention as coordination (cf. for instance Ullman-Margalit, 1977; Sugden,
1986, 2004; Young, 1998; Vanderschraaf, 1995), culminating in Cristina Bicchieri's theory
of social norms (Bicchieri, 2006). In Bicchieri's account, a social norm transforms a mixed-
motive game into a coordination game: when a social norm is in place and agents hold
the relevant expectations about others' preferences, norm-abidance behavior is the preferred
course of action while the same course of action would have been dispreferred in the absence
of a social norm. The expectations involved in Bicchieri's account of social norms are of two
6(kinds: (i) empirical expectations (rst-order beliefs that others will conform) and (ii) nor-
mative expectations (second-order beliefs that other will expect one to conform). Extensive
experimental work by Bicchieri and collegues (cf., e.g., Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009; Bicchieri
and Chavez, 2010) show that empirical expectations by themselves may not be sucient to
motivate compliance to social norms, and that the presence of aligned second-order, nor-
mative expectations, can trigger compliance. While the present experiment does not deal
directly with social norms, it does look at how rst and second-order expectations as elicited
by dierent experimental conditions aect coordination outcomes, thus oering insights on
the role and nature of coordinating expectations.
2 The game
Arguably the most prominent testbeds of the risk-eciency tradeo in the domain of co-
ordination games are the stag hunt and minimum eort (or weak link) games. We limit
ourselves to describe the latter11. On-time aircraft departures are prototypical examples of
coordination problems of the weak-link type (see, e.g., (Knez and Simester, 2001),) since
the airplane cannot take-o before all operations (e.g., fueling, security checks, loading of
luggage, boarding of passengers, etc.) have been completed. Other examples include re-
lationships between dierent branches of a bank, the writing of a grant proposal involving
several participants, an edited volume involving several authors, and many others (Camerer
and Knez, 1996, 1997). Common to all aforementioned examples is the fact that output is
determined by the agent exerting the lowest level of eort (the \weak link"), and any eort
above the minimum is wasted.
A weak-link game is dened by N players who must simultaneously choose a natural
number x in f1;2;:::;Xg. The payo function for the normal form game is dened as
follows:
(xi) = a + b  min(x1;x2;:::xn)   c[xi   min(x1;x2;:::xn)] (1)
where xi is the number chosen by player i, and a, b and c are positive parameters. xi
is intuitively interpreted as the \eort level chosen by player i". Provided that the payo
function is common knowledge, the game has X strict Nash equilibria, corresponding to the
X action combinations in which all players select the same eort level. Furthermore, the
Nash equilibria can be Pareto-ranked, with the combination fx1 = x2 =  = xn = Xg
being the ecient, or payo-dominant equilibrium. Viceversa, thefx1 = x2 =  = xn = 1g
corresponds to the secure equilibrium 12.
In our experiment we chose the following parameter values: N = 2, X = 7, a = 6, b =
c = 1. For these parameters, the game presents seven Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria, with
11In fact the minimum eort game is an extension of the stag hunt game to the case of n strategies with
n > 2. See, e.g., Camerer 2003, ch. 7.
12\Security" is an extension of Harsanyi and Selten's risk-dominance principle to games with more than
two strategies. A \secure" equilibrium is selected when all players choose in accordance with the maximin
criterion.
7the combination fx1 = x2 =  = xn = 7g representing the payo-dominant equilibrium
and the fx1 = x2 =  = xn = 1g the secure equilibrium. Each player is penalized the




1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 7 - - - - - -
2 6 8 - - - - -
3 5 7 9 - - - -
4 4 6 8 10 - - -
5 3 5 7 9 11 - -
6 2 4 6 8 10 12 -
7 1 3 5 7 9 11 13
Table 1: Payo of the weak-link game.
2.1 Related literature
The rst comprehensive experiment on the weak link game was conducted by Van Huyck
et al. (1990), varying group size, parameter values and matching protocol: unravelling to
the lowest minimum over time always occurred with large groups (i.e., N=9,14) interacting
repeatedly. Pairs did slightly better but never converged when randomly rematched in each
round: only when interacting repeatedly in xed pairs were players able to coordinate on the
payo-dominant equilibrium. The results in Van Huyck et al. (1990) have been extensively
replicated ceteris paribus. Taking these ndings as point of departure, subsequent studies
have investigated dierent ways to engineer coordination success in the lab: pre-play com-
munication, inter-group competition, increased nancial incentives, gradual group growth,
and leadership are all mechanisms that have been shown to increase the likelihood of ecient
coordination; others, such as increased feedback, have been tested with inconclusive results
(see Devetag and Ortmann (2007) for a review of experiments on both the weak link and stag
hunt coordination games). Of particular relevance for our study are those experiments that
tested the eectiveness of advice, either from a third party of from players themselves. Van
Huyck et al. (1992) tested the role of non-binding, publicly announced external assignments
in two-person coordination games; their results indicate that assignments are not considered
credible when they conict with payo-dominance or symmetry. It has to be pointed out,
however, that in their games the two principles of payo-dominance and risk-dominance
do not conict. Chaudhuri et. al (2009) tested intergenerational advice in the minimum
eort game with large groups: they found out that the payo-dominant equilibrium was se-
lected only when advice not only was public and publicly shared (i.e., when all advice from
previous generation members was made accessible to all new generation members, and this
fact was common knowledge), but was also common knowledge in the sense of being read
8aloud. The authors call the rst condition \almost common knowledge" as in Rubinstein
(1989), and in their experiments it leads groups to select the Pareto-worst outcome. Only
the common knowledge condition leads to Pareto eciency. Bangun et al. (2006) replicate
the design by Van Huyck et al. (1992) using a stag-hunt game embedding a clear conict
between payo-dominance and risk-dominance. They show that, unlike the Van Huyck et
al. (1992) experiment, an external assignment is sucient to produce coordination on the
payo-dominant outcome, even when the assignment is \almost common knowledge". Fi-
nally, Chaudhuri and Paichayontvijit (2010) test the power of an external assignment (in the
form of a recommendation to choose the strategy consistent with the ecient equilibrium) in
the weak link game with groups of ve players: their 2x2 between-subject design tests xed
vs. random matching, and \common knowledge" vs. \almost common knowledge" of the
assignment. A further treatment tests the power of an increased bonus for coordination. As
in the Chaudhuri et. al (2009) study, \common knowledge" refers to the recommendation
being read aloud, while \almost common knowledge" implies that the recommendation is
handed out to each subject to be read privately, and the fact that everybody is given the
same recommendation is common knowledge. Their ndings show behavior that is largely
consistent with behavior in (Chaudhuri et. al , 2009): with random re-matching of groups in
every round, only the increased nancial incentive (publicly announced) can induce ecient
coordination; neither \common knowledge" nor \almost common knowledge" of the recom-
mendation are sucient; xed groups are generally able to reach successful coordination
even in absence of external interventions. This last nding is at odds with the nding of
Chaudhuri et. al (2009), in which players interacting in xed groups failed to coordinate
successfully even in the presence of a credible assignment; the dierence is most likely due
to the dierent content of the advice (in the study done by Chaudhuri and colleagues, many
players advised their successors to actually select the secure equilibrium), and to the larger
group size of the Chaudhuri et. al (2009) design, a parameter which has been shown to be
crucial in determining the probability of ecient coordination in the weak-link game.
While in (Chaudhuri and Paichayontvijit, 2010) a distinction is made between public
and common knowledge of advice (their conditions 1 and 2, respectively), it is clear from
the discussion above that the two conditions are both common knowledge conditions. The
former condition (in which subjects receive a sheet of paper stating the advice and that every
other player receives the exact same advice and message) induces rst-order knowledge of
the advice (because of the text on the paper), second-order knowledge that everyone has
knowledge of the advice (because the fact that everyone receives the same text is publicly
known), third-order knowledge that everyone knows that everyone has knowledge of the
advice (because everyone knows that everyone knows everyone has received the same text),
and so on. Of course, subjects could be doubtful about whether others have read the message,
paid attention to all of its contents, etc., hence the notion that this is an almost common
knowledge condition.
None of the previous studies on the eciency-enhancing properties of external advice
has tested epistemic conditions weaker than common or at least almost common knowledge.
Our paper lls this gap in the literature, examining, along with common knowledge, rst-
9and second-order mutual knowledge of advice. First-order mutual knowledge is obtained
by an experimental setup that induces knowledge of advice in each player, without oering
subjects the opportunity to draw inferences beyond rst-order, i.e. the experimenter does not
give them enough information to infer that others have knowledge of advice. Second-order
mutual knowledge is similarly obtained by a setup in which knowledge that one's opponent
has knowledge of advice can be inferred, but knowing that the opponent knows that one
knows that cannot.
Our experimental work is linked to a further strand of literature, namely that on game-
theoretic accounts of social conventions. Recently, Cubitt and Sugden (in Cubitt and Sudgen
(2003)) have advanced a formal reconstruction of Lewis's account of social convention that
stresses the importance of inductive reasoning as based of common knowledge of precedent.
On the other hand, evolutionary accounts of social conventions (cf. Binmore (2008), Skyrms
(1996)) deny the relevance of common knowledge for sustaining a social convention (cf. Sillari
(2008) and Rescorla (2011) for overviews of the debate.)
3 Experimental Design
Ninety participants were recruited from Luiss Guido Carli in Rome. Participants were un-
dergraduate students enrolled in the various programs of the University, economics, law and
political science. All experiments were conducted at the CESARE experimental economics
Lab at Luiss, by using a dedicated software. The payo function was the one shown in Table
1 above.
Most sessions were conducted with 10 participants, with a few containing 8 participants.
Each session consisted of a total of 13 rounds of play of the stage game. Participants were
randomly assigned to computer terminals isolated from one another by glass separators. Ini-
tial instructions (equal for all treatments) explaining general rules were distributed in paper
copy and were also read aloud by the experimenter. At this stage, subject were instructed
that the experiment was divided in two parts, and that further instructions would appear
on everybody's monitor as the experiment progressed. Control questions were administered
to assure that the rules of the game had been correctly understood by all. A paper copy
of the payo matrix was given to each subject, and the same matrix also appeared on each
participant's screen when submitting their choice for the round. Subjects were told that
they would be randomly paired with another anonymous participant from the room in each
round. When everybody had entered their choice, each subject received private feedback
regarding chosen number, minimum number chosen in the pair and payo earned in the
round. In order to enhance independence between rounds, the nal payment was based on
a randomly selected round, and this was explicitly stated in the instructions.
The rst three rounds were equal for all treatments and were played with no external
intervention, to increase comparability with previous experiments (Chaudhuri and Paichay-
ontvijit, 2010) and to allow adequate learning of the payo function. In fact, we wanted to
avoid subjects following the experimenter's suggestion simply as a result of inexperience and
being unaware of all its possible implications.
10After the third round had been completed and before subjects could enter their choice
for the fourth round, the experiment in all treatments was interrupted and subjects were
asked to state the following two forecasts on a sheet of paper:
 the average number chosen in period 4 by all participants in the session
 the average forecast expressed by all participants in the session
Sincere belief elicitation was incentivized in the following way: for each forecast, subjects
earned 1 ECU minus the dierence between the stated average and the actual average, up to
0. After all participants had stated their beliefs, the experiment was resumed, and subjects
could make their choices for round 4 and subsequent rounds.
The following four treatments were conducted. In the control treatment (2 sessions,
N =16), subject were asked to state their beliefs at the end of the third round, and then
asked to proceed with making their choices for round 4 and the remaining rounds, with no
further instructions.
In the mutual knowledge of level 1 treatment (3 sessions, N = 30), before subjects were
asked to make their predictions and choice for round 4 and at the beginning of all subsequent
rounds of play, the following statement appeared on every participant's monitor:
We suggest you to pick number 7
In fact, note that, if both you and the other participant pick 7, you both
earn the maximum possible payoff, 13 ECUs
The fact that the same suggestion appeared on every participant's monitor was not
common knowledge13. Subjects had to click on \continue" to move from the suggestion
screen to the choice screen, to assure that the suggestion was not overlooked.
In the mutual knowledge of level 2 treatment (3 sessions, N = 26), before subjects were
asked to make their forecasts and choice for period 4, and at the beginning of all subsequent
rounds of play, the same statement shown above appeared on every participant's monitor.
In addition, the lower part of the screen reported the following:
Click on \send" to send this suggestion to the participant with
whom you are paired in this round.
Subjects had to click \send" to move to the following screen. The following screen
reported the sentence shown below:
the participant with whom you are paired in this round is sending
you this message:
followed by the suggestion text.
The subject was asked to click \read" to send the other player a conrmation that the
message had been read before moving to the next screen. The last screen reported:
13This design feature marks an important dierence in our setup with respect to that in (Chaudhuri and
Paichayontvijit, 2010).
11the participant with whom you are paired notifies you that they
have received the message that you sent them.
Then the choice screen appeared. Neither the suggestion appearance nor the message
exchange was common knowledge among participants.
Finally, in the common knowledge treatment (2 sessions, N = 18), the suggestion text
was read aloud by the experimenter before subjects were asked to state their forecast for
period 4. The suggestion was read aloud at the beginning of round 4 only, and not at the
beginning of every subsequent round. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate two samples of the computer
interface used in the experiment.
Figure 1: The suggestion screen
To facilitate the exposition of the results, we will refer to our four treatments according
to the following stipulation:
 control - C = control
 mutual knowledge - MK = mutual knowledge of level 1
 message - Message = mutual knowledge of level 2
 common knowledge - CK = common knowledge.
The control treatment is necessary to provide us with a benchmark for the frequency of
coordination, as well as to control for learning and restart eects. The other three treatments
allow us to test the eect that adding one level of knowledge has on the probability of
coordination on the ecient equilibrium.
The choice to use the payo function of (Van Huyck et al., 1990) is motivated by the
fact that this payo function has already been tested for a group size of two players with
12Figure 2: The choice screen
random matching. Results have shown high variability and no convergence over time in this
condition. To our knowledge, this is the worst coordination outcome that has been reported
in a minimum eort game with group size of two. As a high level of coordination failure
in our baseline treatment is a necessary condition for our experimental treatments to be of
interest, we chose to implement the same payo function used by Van Huyck and co-authors.
Experiments lasted forty minutes on average, including instruction time. Average total
earnings were equal to 13.5 euro, including the 2 euro show up fee.
We formulated the following hypotheses:
 coordination failure is the modal outcome in the control treatment
 both the share of choices equal to 7 and the frequency of ecient coordination outcomes
increase as more knowledge levels are added
Hence, we expected to observe widespread coordination failure in the control treatment,
and higher frequencies of coordination success as moving from the control to the common
knowledge treatment.
4 Results
4.1 Analysis of choice behavior
Figure 3 reports the average choices, whilst average minima and relative frequency of choices
equal to 7 over time in the four treatments are reported in Figure 4 and Figure 5, respectively.
All values are pooled across sessions. The following facts are worth noticing: rst, both
minima and 7 choices in the control treatment indicate widespread coordination failure with
13no detectable trend over time. Minima stabilize around 4 and choices of 7 around 40 per
cent. Hence, the control treatment by and large replicates previous ndings obtained with
the same group size and matching protocol in (Van Huyck et al., 1990). Secondly, all
experimental treatments reveal an improvement in coordination with respect to the control,
as hypothesized.
However, somewhat surprisingly and contrary to our hypothesis, the increase is not mono-
tonic in knowledge levels. More specically, the highest values are attained in the message
treatment, while the values for the mutual knowledge and common knowledge treatments
lie between the two extremes of \control" and \message".
Figure 3: Average choices over time, all sessions pooled
Figure 4: Average minima over time, all sessions pooled
14Figure 5: Relative frequency of choices equal to 7 over time, all sessions pooled
Figure 6 reports the frequency of the choice of 7 in rounds 4-13 separately for each treat-
ment, and in rounds 1-3 for all treatments combined. Figure 7 reports the same information,
respectively, for round 4 only and for round 1 only.
Figure 6 clearly shows that, overall, the message treatment was by far the most eective
in fostering choice of the strategy supporting the ecient equilibrium. The second nding
worth noticing is that mutual knowledge of level 1 is able to induce the choice of 7 in a
proportion comparable to that attained in the common knowledge treatment.
By comparing the same data in round 4 only, as reported in Figure 7, we can measure
the eect of dierent levels of knowledge excluding the potentially confounding factor given
by message repetition. Moreover, the salience of the publicly read announcement in the CK
treatment is supposed to be highest in round 4 as compared to subsequent rounds. Hence,
the CK treatment is given its best chance to produce ecient coordination immediately
after the public announcement. Data from round 4 suggest that the message treatment is
the most eective even without the aid of message repetition; in fact, choices of 7 amount
to 80 per cent of all choices in that treatment. The CK treatment is the second best, with
60 per cent of 7 choices. MK, however, does almost as well as the CK treatment, whereas
the percentage in the control treatment does not dier from that observed in the rst three
rounds of play.
The relative ranking of the four dierent knowledge levels on goodness of coordination
is further supported by data on equilibrium play. Figure 8 reports the percentage of play
consistent with the ecient equilibrium (i.e., both players in the pair picking 7) in the four
treatments in rounds 4-13. In the message treatment more than half of play (52 per cent)
resulted in coordination on the ecient equilibrium, whereas data for the CK treatment and
for the MK treatment amount to 28.8 per cent and 27.3 per cent, respectively. Hence, again,
mutual knowledge of level 1 is comparable to common knowledge in its eciency-enhancing
15Figure 6: Frequency of choices equal to 7 in rounds 4-13, disaggregated by treatment, and
in rounds 1-3, all treatments pooled
Figure 7: Frequency of choices equal to 7 in round 4, disaggregated by treatment, and in
round 1, all treatments pooled.
eects, and mutual knowledge of level 2 fares substantially better than common knowledge.
In accordance with our hypothesis and with previous results, the control treatment results
in the highest ineciency, with only 13.8 per cent of ecient equilibrium play. Consistently,
data on the standard deviation of choices in the four treatments in round 4-13 (Figure 9)
reveal that the message treatment reduces strategic uncertainty the most with respect to the
control, while the MK and CK treatment values are indistinguishable.
Pairwise comparisons between choices in the rst round in the dierent treatments reveal
16Figure 8: Percentage of equilibrium play in rounds 4-13
Figure 9: Standard deviation of choices in rounds 4-13, disaggregated by treatment
that there are no statistically signicant dierences in choice distributions in period 1 (Mann-
Whitney U test; control-mutual knowledge p = :65; control-message p = :499; control-
common knowledge p = :95; mutual knowledge-message p = :83; mutual knowledge-common
knowledge p = :51; message-common knowledge p = :44. All p-values are two-tailed).
Table 2 reports results of the Fisher's exact test on the dierences in the share of 7
choices in rounds 4-13, and Table 3 reports results of the same test on the frequency of
ecient equilibrium play. All dierences are highly signicant except that between MK and
CK.
17Control Mutual knowledge Message Common knowledge
Control p = :0061 p = :0001 p = :0047
Mutual knowledge p = :0001 p = :7057
Message p = :0008
Common knowledge
Table 2: Fisher's exact test on the frequency of choices 7 in the dierent treatments in rounds
4-13 (all p-values are two-tailed).
Control Mutual knowledge Message Common knowledge
Control p = :0010 p = :0001 p = :0009
Mutual knowledge p = :0001 p = :7528
Message p = :0001
Common knowledge
Table 3: Fisher's exact test on the frequency of equilibrium play in the dierent treatments
in rounds 4-13 (all p-values are two-tailed).
4.2 Analysis of beliefs
Figure 10 shows the distribution of rst order beliefs (i.e., subjects' forecasts about the
average of all participants' choices in round 4) by treatment. It is noteworthy that beliefs
behavior is highly consistent with choice behavior, in that a shift of the distribution in the
direction of higher numbers can be detected when moving from the control treatment to the
MK, CK and message treatments. In the message treatment, roughly 65 per cent of forecasts
are concentrated on the value 7.
Table 4 reports some descriptive statistics on rst order, second order beliefs and choices
in round 4 by treatment14.
High consistency between beliefs and choices is revealed by looking at the column of mean
values. Data on beliefs reveal important insights: rst, they support the hypothesis that the
suggestion (and its related knowledge levels) rendered subjects on average more optimistic,
and greater optimism in turn induced the choice of the risky action signicantly more often
with respect to the absence of an external suggestion. In other words, an experimenter
demand eect (Zizzo, 2010) as an explanation of behavior in our experimental treatments
can be safely excluded. Rather, the most plausible explanation of our subjects' behavior
involves increased optimism and trust. Moreover, data on beliefs strongly point at the fact
that subjects in the MK and message treatments believed that other participants in the
session received the same type of information that they themselves received.
The positive eect of any knowledge level can be detected by looking at minimum values
in column 3. Unlike the control treatment, where a minimum of 1 is observed both at the
14One subject in the control treatment stated a rst order belief equal to 10, one subject in the message
treatment stated a second order belief equal to 42, and one subject in the common knowledge treatment
stated a second order belief equal to 8. We eliminated these outliers from the computation of the average
values and of the subsequent correlation indexes. The results of the correlation do not change if we include
the outliers. We did not observe any anomalous behavior in these subjects at the choice level, hence they
may have not understood the prediction task correctly.
18Figure 10: Distribution of beliefs by treatment
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
1st order belief CONTROL 15 1 7 4,57 1,568
2nd order belief CONTROL 16 1 7 4,31 1,740
Choice in round 4 CONTROL 16 1 7 5,13 1,962
1st order belief MK 30 1 7 5,47 1,630
2nd order belief MK 30 1 7 5,58 1,602
Choice in round MK 30 1 7 5,73 1,999
1st order belief MESSAGE 26 3 7 6,18 1,311
2nd order belief MESSAGE 25 4 7 6,37 1,026
Choice in round MESSAGE 26 3 7 6,58 1,027
1st order belief CK 18 2 7 5,88 1,597
2nd order belief CK 17 4 7 6,00 1,225
Choice in round CK 18 2 7 5,83 1,724
Table 4: Descriptive statistics on rst order, second order beliefs and choices in round 4 by
treatment
belief and at the choice level, in all experimental treatments the external announcement is
able to eliminate the secure action (i.e., the choice of 1) from both participants choices and
forecasts. Finally, Table 5 reports the correlation coecients between rst order beliefs,
second order beliefs and choices in round 4 separately for each treatment. As the table
shows, all relevant correlation coecients are positive and highly signicant.
191st order pred. C 2nd order pred. C 4th round choice C
1st order pred. C Corr. Coe. 1,00 0,86 0,61
Sig. 0,00 0,02
N 15,00 15,00 15,00
2nd order pred. C Corr. Coe. 0,86 1,00 0,61
Sig. 0,00 0,01
N 15,00 16,00 16,00
1st order pred. MK 2nd order pred. MK 4th round choice MK
1st order pred. MK Corr. Coe. 1,00 0,80 0,38
Sig. . 0,00 0,04
N 30,00 30,00 30,00
2nd order pred. MK Corr. Coe. 0,80 1,00 0,59
Sig. 0,00 . 0,00
N 30,00 30,00 30,00
1st order pred. M 2nd order pred. M 4th round choice M
1st order pred. M Corr. Coe. 1,00 0,92 0,69
Sig. 0,00 0,00
N 26,00 25,00 26,00
2nd order pred. M Corr. Coe. 0,92 1,00 0,51
Sig. 0,00 . 0,01
N 25,00 25,00 25,00
1st order pred. CK 2nd order pred. CK 4th round choice CK
1st order pred. CK Corr. Coe. 1,00 0,74 0,76
Sig. . 0,00 0,00
N 18,00 17,00 18,00
2nd order pred. CK Corr. Coe. 0,74 1,00 0,72
Sig. 0,00 0,00
N 17,00 17,00 17,00
Table 5: Spearman's rho correlation coecients (with relative p-values, two-tailed) between
subjects' 1st order, 2nd order predictions, and 4th round choices, divided by treatment. The
relevant signicance values are reported in bold face.
5 Conclusions and Further Work
Intuition, sometimes backed by formal results as in the analysis of the so-called coordinated
attack problem (Fagin et al., 1996), has long been suggesting that the rational solution of
coordination games required common-knowledge of the players' rationality and choices.15
Despite the numerous relaxations to this requirement that are now widely accepted in the
game-theoretic literature, (see, e.g. Aumann and Brandenburger , 1995), our results to the
eect that common knowledge of advice does no better than mutual knowledge appears to
be quite surprising nonetheless.
Our attempt at explaining this unexpected result is best framed in terms of the corre-
lated unexpected nding, namely that second-order mutual knowledge of advice leads to
the selection of ecient equilibria more frequently than any other epistemic condition we
investigated.
Why is second-order mutual knowledge so eective at promoting ecient coordination?
To identify a plausible explanation of our nding, it is convenient to focus on the dierences
between the second-order mutual knowledge condition and all other conditions in our exper-
iment. To induce a second-order expectation without giving them grounds to legitimately
infer further levels of mutual knowledge of advice, subjects are instructed to exchange mes-
sages in order to continue the experiment. Such a basic communication exchange is only
present in the second-order condition, therefore we surmise that it is an important factor in
the explanation of our results. Message exchange may for instance give rise to expectations
15See however Parikh (2005) for an extensive discussion on the far reaching consequence of nite, indeed
small, level knowledge and Hosni and Paris (2005) for an analysis of coordination which dispenses with
common knowledge altogether.
20of mutual commitment between players, both in the sense that receiving the message makes
the receiver believe that the sender will do her part to honor the advice (eliciting trust), and
in the sense that sending the message makes the sender believe that the receiver will expect
that the sender ought to conform to the advice she sent
Thus, not only it is relevant what kind of beliefs players hold, but also how they arrived at
holding such beliefs. In particular, beliefs formed through the embryonic communication used
in our second-order condition seem to foster compliance with the content of the exchanged
message. Recall how in Bicchieri's theory of social norms second-order expectations play a
crucial role as normative expectations. While rst-order, empirical expectations may not
suce to motivate compliance with the social norm, rst- and second-order expectations,
when aligned, may succeed in bringing about norm compliance. Our study is not concerned
with social norms, however the coordination success observed in our second-order mutual
knowledge condition, paired with the observation of high correlation between rst-, second-
order beliefs, and choices, highlights the relevance of second-order expectations for motivating
action. In light of this observation, our hypothesis that subjects' second-order beliefs have
normative content calls for further research.
Our result that second-order mutual knowledge works better than rst-order in fostering
ecient equilibrium choices may lead to the generalization that there is a monotonic rela-
tionship between players' abidance to advice and levels of mutual knowledge of advice. If
that were the case, common knowledge of advice would result in highest level of ecient
coordination. However, that is not what is observed in our common knowledge condition,
lending support to the hypothesis formulated above that second-order expectations carry
more weight because of their normative character. Our results, however, show not only that
common knowledge of advice is not necessary to achieve ecient coordination, but also that
it is not sucient. This result bears on the literature on the relation between convention and
common knowledge, showing that common knowledge is not an eective device for creating
salience and fostering ecient coordination, at least in the short run.
We would like to close this paper by insisting on our nding that coordination is more
likely under mutual knowledge than common knowledge of advice. As we noted before
the surprise might be accounted for by assuming a psychological relevance of the sugges-
tion. If true this might suggest that belief formation mechanism weights more than the
sole epistemic condition (common knowledge) towards the selection of the ecient equilib-
rium. This interpretation seems to be posing a challenge for bayesian epistemology, insofar
as the latter focusses only on the information revealed by the agent's (degrees of) belief.
Yet the challenge is only apparent, for the surprising performance of mutual knowledge in
the message treatment might well depend on the subjects' \updating" on the expectation
of mutual commitment. This emerging notion of belief update, however, clearly deserves
further investigation.
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A Experimental Instructions
A.1 General Instructions (common to all treatments)
A.1.1 Introduction
Welcome! You are about to participate in an experiment on decision making funded by the
Ministry of Education, University and Research. Instructions are simple, and if you follow
them correctly and make appropriate decisions you will be able to earn an appreciable sum
of money that will be paid to you privately and in cash. All choices that you make will be
stored and processed anonymously. All your earnings in the experiment will be expressed in
Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). 1 ECU is worth 1 euro.
25A.1.2 The choice task
The present experimental session is composed of 10 participants and will last a total of 13
periods, divided into 2 parts: the rst part will last for 3 periods, and the remaining part
will last for 10 periods. The choice task will be the same for all the 13 periods. You are
now listening to the initial instructions, to be followed by further written instructions that
will appear on your monitor. At the beginning of each period the software will pair each of
you with another participant from the room picked randomly. You and the other participant
will both have to choose - independently from one another and without any possibility to
communicate - one and only one number from 1 to 7 (included). The euros you earn will
depend on the number you have chosen and on the minimum number that has been chosen
in the pair (that is, the lower number between the one chosen by you and the one chosen
by the participant with whom you are paired). Each of you has been given a paper copy of
the double-entry table that will help you compute your earnings. The table is identical for
all participants, and the same table will appear on your monitor every time you will have to
make your choice for the round. Please have a look at the table now. The rows of the table
report your possible choices in every period, i.e., the numbers from 1 to 7. The columns
report the minimum number that has been chosen in the pair.
The table cells report the ECUs that you earn in correspondence of each possible outcome.
The ECUs you earn are in the cell at the intersection between the row corresponding to the
number you have chosen and the column corresponding to the minimum number chosen.
For example, suppose you choose number 4 and the other participant chooses number 3: the
minimum number in the pair is 3: therefore, your earnings are in the cell at the intersection
between row 4 and column 3 (that is 8 ECUs).
Now, please pay attention to your monitor. The central part of the screen (green back-
ground) reports your earnings table, which is identical to the paper copy that you have. You
will have to make your choice by typing the number chosen in the appropriate text box at
the center of the blue square and by clicking on `OK'. When all participants have chosen,
your monitor will show you the period outcome: the number you have chosen, the minimum
number chosen and the ECUs you have earned. At any time you will be able to double-check
that your earnings have been computed correctly by using the copy of the earnings table
that has been given to you. By clicking on `Continue' you will move to the next period.
Please remember that at the beginning of each period the software will match you with a
participant picked randomly; therefore, in general you will be paired with a dierent par-
ticipant in each period, although it will happen that you will be paired with someone more
than once. In any case you will never be told the identity of the participants with whom you
are paired.
At the end of the third period the experiment will be interrupted and the monitor will
show you further instructions for you to follow. At some point, BEFORE YOU MAKE
YOUR CHOICE FOR PERIOD 4, the experimenter will ask you to take the blank sheet of
paper that is on your desk and write the following 2 predictions:
 The average number that will be chosen by all participants in period 4, i.e. the arith-
metic mean of all choices in period 4
26 The average prediction of participants, i.e., the average of all participants' forecasts
regarding choices in period 4
This information will be asked only at the beginning of period 4, and you will be paid in
the following way: for each prediction, you will earn 1 euro minus the arithmetic dierence
between your predicted value and the realized value, for a maximum of 2 euro in the case
in which both your predictions are 100 per cent correct. The true realized values will be
computed and publicly revealed at the end of the experiment.
A.1.3 Your earnings
Your earnings will be computed as follows: at the end of the experiment, the software will
randomly pick one among the 13 periods, and each of you will be paid according to the ECUs
he/she has earned in that period. The nal screenshot will inform you of which period has
been extracted and of how many ECUs you have earned. This earnings will be summed to
the earnings from your predictions and to the 2 euro show up fee. Each one of you will be
paid privately in cash. After receiving your payment, you will be free to leave the lab.
We now ask you to respond to all the questions reported in the anonymous questionnaire
that has just been handed to you, and to give the questionnaire back to the experimenter.
In case of incorrect answers, the relevant part of the instructions will be repeated. During
the experiment you are not allowed to communicate in any way. If any forms of verbal
or non-verbal communication are detected, the session will be immediately interrupted and
nobody will be paid.
If you have questions, please raise your hands now.
A.2 Control questions (common to all treatments)
The present questionnaire is anonymous and only serves the purpose of making sure that all
participants have understood the rules of the experiment before it starts.
 QUESTION 1. Imagine you have chosen number 1 in a period, and imagine that the
participant with whom you are paired has chosen number 3. According to the table,
how many ECUs have you earned? How many ECUs has he/she earned?
 QUESTION 2. Imagine you have chosen number 3 in a period, and imagine that the
participant with whom you are paired has chosen number 2. According to the table,
how many ECUs have you earned? How many ECUs has he/she earned?
 QUESTION 3. Your earnings will be determined by the ECUs that you have earned in
one of the 13 periods that will be picked randomly by the software: TRUE or FALSE
(mark with an X)
 QUESTION 4. You will always be paired with the same participant for all 13 periods:
TRUE or FALSE (mark with an X)
27A.3 Treatment-specic instructions appearing on each subject's
monitor at the start of round 4
Note that these instructions were not read aloud.
A.3.1 Control treatment
Before proceeding to make your choices for the remaining 10 periods, the experimenter will
ask you to write down your predictions for period 4 on the blank sheet of paper that you can
nd on your desk. After all participants have written their predictions, the experiment will
restart. The matching rules and the rules determining your earnings in each period remain
invariant
 PREDICTION 1: the average number that will be chosen by all participants in period
4, i.e. the arithmetic mean of all choices in period 4
 PREDICTION 2: the average prediction of participants, i.e., the average of all partic-
ipants' forecast regarding choices in period 4
Now please write your predictions.
A.3.2 Mutual knowledge treatment
Before proceeding to make your choices for the remaining 10 periods, the experimenter will
ask you to write down your predictions for period 4 on the blank sheet of paper that you can
nd on your desk. After all participants have written their predictions, the experiment will
restart. The matching rules and the rules determining your earnings in each period remain
invariant
SUGGESTION
WE SUGGEST YOU TO CHOOSE NUMBER 7. Note, in fact, that if both
participants choose number 7, they both earn their maximum earnings, that is
13 ECUs
Now please write your predictions:
 PREDICTION 1: the average number that will be chosen by all participants in period
4, i.e. the arithmetic mean of all choices in period 4
 PREDICTION 2: the average prediction of participants, i.e., the average of all partic-
ipants' forecast regarding choices in period 4
28A.3.3 Message treatment
Before proceeding to make your choices for the remaining 10 periods, follow the instructions
that will appear on your monitor. The software will create the random pairings among
participants. Then you will be shown a message and you will be asked to send the message
to the participant with whom you have been paired for period 4.
BEFORE you make your choice the experimenter will ask you to write down your pre-
dictions for period 4 on the blank sheet of paper that you can nd on your desk. After all
participants have written their predictions, the experiment will restart. The matching rules
and the rules determining your earnings in each period remain invariant. Now please follow
the instructions on your monitor and then wait for the experimenter to tell you to write
down your predictions. es
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